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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 
WESTERN DIVISION
NANCY HALEY,
P laintiff,
v.
COMMUNITY MERCY HEALTH 
PARTNERS D/B/A SPRINGFIELD 
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 3 :11 -cv-232  
JUDGE WALTER H. RICE
DECISION AND ENTRY OVERRULING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. #13); TELEPHONE CONFERENCE SET
P la in tiff Nancy Haley filed suit against her form er employers, C om m unity 
M ercy Health Partners, d/b/a Springfield Regional Medical Center and Catholic 
Healthcare Partners (co llective ly "SRM C"), alleging violations o f the Age 
D iscrim ination in Employment A c t ("AD EA"), 29 U.S.C. § 623, the Am ericans w ith  
Disabilities A c t ("A D A "), 42  U.S.C. § 12112 , and the Family and Medical Leave 
A c t o f 1993 ("FM LA "), 29 U.S.C. § 2615 . P la in tiff also alleges state law  civil 
rights vio la tions under Chapter 4112  o f the Ohio Revised Code fo r age and 
d isability d iscrim ination. The Court has federal question jurisd iction, pursuant to  
28 U.S.C. § 1331, over Haley's federal claims and supplemental jurisd iction  over 
her state law  claims pursuant to  28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Pending before the Court is the Defendants' M otion fo r Summary Judgm ent 
pursuant to  Rule 56(a) o f the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Doc. #13). For the 
reasons set fo rth  below, the Court OVERRULES Defendants' motion.
I. Factual Background
The fo llow ing  sum m ary is confined to  the undisputed facts. Nancy Haley 
worked as a registered nurse fo r SRMC from  June o f 1978 until April o f 2010 , a 
period jus t short of th ir ty -tw o  years. D ef.'s  A nsw er (Doc. #3) f  20; Def. Ex. #55 
(Doc. #18-54 ). She was 58 years old when SRMC term inated her em ployment. 
Doc. #3 f  9. From 1982 onwards, Haley worked as a S ta ff Nurse in SRMC's 
operating room. Id. f  21. A t the tim e o f her term ination, Haley performed part o f 
her duties as a member o f SRMC's Cardiac Team. Doc. #18-54 ; Elliot Dep. (Doc. 
#17) at 21; Abraham Dep. (Doc. #15) at 44. Barbara Elliot was Haley's supervisor 
from  Ju ly of 2007  until Haley's term ination. Doc. #17 at 21. Elliot was a nurse 
manager in charge of the operating room and reported d irectly  to  Terri Abraham, 
an SRMC director. Doc. #15 at 9-10.
A. Haley's FMLA Leave
During her tenure at SRMC, Haley took FMLA leave due to  her ow n illness 
and fam ily  members' serious health conditions. Between March of 2007  and 
March of 2008 , Haley took tw o  to  three days o f in te rm itten t FMLA leave every six 
to eight weeks in order to care fo r her fa ther, w ho suffered from  a cardiac
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condition. PI. Ex. A (Doc. #22-1) at 1-2. A fte r her fa the r's  death in July o f 2008 ,
Haley took the same type o f in te rm itten t leave to care fo r her mother, who also 
had heart problems and had recently been diagnosed w ith  breast cancer. Doc. #3 
1 27; Doc. #18-55  at 3-4.
Haley herself was diagnosed w ith  breast cancer in November of 2009  and 
underw ent tw o  surgical procedures fo r treatm ent. Doc. #18  at 33; Doc. #18 -54  
at 5-6. She took approxim ately five  and a half weeks of FMLA leave during this 
tim e and returned to  w ork on January 18, 2010. Doc. #18 at 33; Doc. #18 -54  at 
5 -6 .1
B. SRMC's Corrective Action Plan
SRMC disciplines employees pursuant to  its "C orrective A c tio n " policy, also 
referred to  as "C A P ." Doc. #24-1 . CAP is a four-stage, progressive process. 
Doc. #17 at 32-33 . The process is "one tra ck ," meaning th a t the violations accrue 
tow ards term ination regardless o f the type of behavior th a t prompted discipline. 
Id. In other w ords, SRMC may place an employee at one disciplinary level and 
then later place the employee at a higher level, even if the incidents involved
1 The parties provide several d iffe ren t dates fo r th is  period o f leave. Haley states 
th a t the FMLA leave occurred from  November 20 until November 27, 2009 , and 
from  December 8, 2 009 , until January 29, 2010 . Doc. #22  at 7. In its Answer, 
SRMC states tha t Haley's FMLA leave lasted from  November 23 to  November 27, 
2009 , and from  December 3, 2009 , to  January 17, 2010 , w ith  Haley then 
w orking half days until February 18. Doc #3 f  7. In the ir memoranda, the parties 
do not mention th is  discrepancy nor do they dispute the general length of the leave 
involved. The Court does not find the s ligh t d ifference in these dates to  be 
material to  Haley's FMLA claims.
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unrelated behavior. Id. Referred to  as a "S tep" or "C AP ," each stage moves an
employee closer to  term ination, but also institu tes an "action p lan" fo r performance 
im provem ent. Id. at 32. If an em ployee's violation warrants discipline, the policy 
mandates tha t the supervisor com plete a Corrective A ction fo rm , "w h ich  shall be 
signed by the associate and placed in the associate 's personnel file in the Human 
Resources D epartm ent." Doc. #24-1 at 1.
The firs t step o f discipline, CAP 1, involves an oral warning or "counseling 
session" tha t amounts to  "more than an anecdotal conversation or a coaching 
session" and is memorialized in an em ployee's personnel file . Doc. #17 at 37. 
CAP 1 may be bypassed if an in fraction is deemed "serious enough" by a 
supervisor, but there is an expectation th a t a supervisor w ould firs t discuss the 
issue w ith  a departm ent head before skipping a s tep .2 Doc. #15 at 28; Doc. #24-1 
at 1. CAP 2 involves a w ritten  warning, and CAP 3 involves a "final w arn ing" tha t 
may or may not involve an em ployee's three day suspension. Doc. #24-1 at 2. If 
an employee reaches the fou rth  step, CAP 4, he or she is term inated. Id.) Doc. 
#17 at 38.
2 In Haley's situation, Step One was bypassed. It is noted tha t SRMS's policy in 
fa c t a llows a supervisor to  bypass more than the initial step: "H ow ever, the 
circum stances, severity, in tent and frequency o f the offense could ju s tify  in itia tion 
o f corrective action at Steps Tw o, Three, or Four." Doc. #24-1 at 2.
4
c. CAP 2
In the summer of 2009 , SRMC issued a Haley a CAP 2 fo r missing pages 
w hile she was on call. Doc. #18 -50 . On call employees are expected to  carry a 
pager, provide an alternative form  of con tact (such as a cell phone), and report to  
SRMC 20 -30  m inutes after a page. Doc. #17 at 118, 121. Haley did not in itia lly  
respond to  the hospita l's page, was called at home, and arrived at the hospital 37 
m inutes after the initial page on June 2, 2009. Doc. #18-50. The second page 
occurred on Ju ly 13, 2009 , when the page w ent out at 8 :15  p.m. and Haley 
clocked in at 9 :51 . Id. The Corrective A ction  Form was signed by Elliot, but Haley 
did not sign it. Id  at 2. In the space fo r the em ployee's signature, it is instead 
w ritte n  "D id n 't sign -  d id n 't believe event 6 /2  was her fa u lt."  Id.
D. CAP 3
SRMC placed Haley at the CAP 3 discipline step on November 9, 2009 , fo r 
tw o  incidents involving patient "s ite  m arking." Doc. #18-52 . The hospita l's 
Universal Protocol Policy outlines the procedures by w hich a pa tien t's  "proper 
surgical or procedure site(s)" are verified before surgery. Doc. #16-3 . To 
safeguard against the occurrence o f incorrect surgical procedures, the policy 
requires th a t the surgeon mark the site and tha t he or she do so prior to  surgery 
while the patient is "awake and aw are" fo r verifica tion purposes. Id. On October 
9, 20 09 , Haley took an unmarked patient into the operating room. Doc. #18-52 . 
SRMC placed Haley at CAP 3 based on th a t incident and another tha t occurred on
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October 16. Id. The Corrective A ction  Form stated tha t both incidents violated
the "established hospital policy regarding site marking fo r invasive procedures," 
resulting in Haley being placed on unpaid leave and having to  make a brief 
presentation to  operating room s ta ff about the policy. Id.
E. CAP 4 & Termination
Haley took  " in te rm itte n t" FMLA leave approved by SRMC on the fo llow ing  
dates in 2010 : January 25 and 26, March 4 through March 12, and April 15 and 
April 16. Doc. #3 at I f  34, 36.
On February 12, 2010, Haley's husband, suffering from  a heart condition, 
was transported to  SRMC. Doc. #3 f  35. Haley accompanied her husband to  the 
hospital and contacted SRMC regarding her inability to  w ork her sh ift tha t day. Id. 
SRMC did not c lassify any o f Haley's tim e o ff during her husband's three-day 
hospita lization as FMLA leave, and marked her absence on February 12, 2010 , as 
"unexcused." Id. 35 , 41.
Three days after returning from  her April FMLA leave, on Monday, April 19, 
SRMC term inated Haley. Doc. #13-1 at 2. Haley's absence on February 12, 
2010 , when she was w ith  her hospitalized husband, was listed as one of three 
unexcused absences on the Corrective A ction  form  filled out fo r her term ination. 
Id.) Doc. #3 1 41 ; Doc. #15-1 at 1; Doc. #17 at 80. Those absences, along w ith  
eleven instances o f tardiness, were listed as the reasons fo r placing Haley at CAP 
4 and term inating her. Doc. #15-1 at 1. Elliot had no conversations w ith  Haley
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prior to  her term ination about excessive tardiness or absences. Doc. #17 at 81-
83.
II. Procedural Background
On July 1, 2011 , Haley filed su it against SMRC, alleging age d iscrim ination 
claims under the ADEA (Count I) and under Ohio civil rights law  (Count II); 
d isability d iscrim ination claims under the AD A (Count III) and under Ohio civil rights 
law (Count IV); and a claim under the FMLA fo r retaliation and interference (Count 
V). Doc. #1. In her com plaint, Haley alleges th a t the discipline adm inistered by 
SRMC and its te rm ination of her em ploym ent constitu ted  d iscrim ination based on 
her age and her d isab ility  from  breast cancer, as shown by SRMC's d ifferentia l 
trea tm ent of a younger, non-disabled cow orker w ith  a similar em ploym ent record. 
Id. at 3. She also alleges tha t SRMC "disciplined her fo r conduct th a t was either 
manufactured or in fla ted " a fter she took  FMLA leave to  care fo r her ailing mother. 
Id. at 2. P la intiff fu rthe r alleges tha t SRMC's term ination of her em ploym ent after 
P la in tiff took FMLA leave fo r her own breast cancer treatm ent and her husband's 
heart condition amounted to  retaliation fo r exercising her s ta tu to ry  righ t to  tha t 
leave. Id. She seeks injunctive relief, com pensatory damages, punitive and 
liquidated damages, a tto rney 's  fees and costs. Id. at 10-11. SRMC filed an 
Answ er to  Haley's Com plaint on A ugust 30 , 2011 . Doc. #3.
SRMC filed a M otion fo r Summary Judgm ent on June 25, 2012 . Doc. #13. 
In its M otion fo r Sum m ary Judgm ent, SRMC argues th a t Haley fa ils to  present a
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prima facie case of an age d iscrim ination claim because she presents no d irect 
evidence o f d iscrim ination and the only indirect evidence arises from  unintentional 
d iffe rentia l treatm ent of a younger employee. Id. at 11. SRMC also argues tha t 
Haley fails to  present a prima facie case of d isability d iscrim ination. Id. at 12. The 
hospital claims tha t Haley concedes tha t she is not disabled, and tha t she therefore 
fails even to  establish the firs t element o f a d isab ility  d iscrim ination claim. Id. 
Furthermore, SRMC argues tha t she cannot succeed on a perceived d isability  claim 
because there is no evidence to  show  tha t her employers perceived her to  be 
disabled or tha t they regarded her as being substantia lly  lim ited by a d isab ility  in 
perform ing her job. Id. at 13. SRMC contends th a t the tim ing o f Haley's 
term ination is insu ffic ien t to  show d iscrim ination, and tha t Haley's h istory of 
discipline at SMRC was a legitim ate and nondiscrim inatory reason fo r her 
term ination. Id. at 14, 18. Haley's only evidence o f pretext is the tem poral 
p rox im ity  of her term ination to  her last absence, SRMC argues, w hich the hospital 
believes is insu ffic ien t to  rebut its "num erous and legitim ate reasons" fo r 
discharging her. Id. at 18.
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Pla in tiff Haley responded w ith  her Memorandum in Opposition, filed 
September 13, 2 0 1 2 .3 Doc. #22 . A Reply in Support of Defendants' M otion fo r 
Summary Judgm ent was filed on October 1, 2012. Doc. #26.
III. Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets fo rth  the standard and 
procedures fo r summary judgm ent. Upon motion by either party, " [t]he  court shall 
grant summary judgm ent if the m ovant shows tha t there is no genuine dispute as 
to  any material fa c t and the m ovant is entitled to  judgm ent as a m atter o f law ." 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party opposing the m otion m ust "c it[e ] to  particular 
parts of materials in the record, including depositions, docum ents, . . . a ffidav its  or 
declarations . . . admissions, interrogatory answ ers," as well as other relevant 
materials, to  dem onstrate the existence of a genuine issue o f material fac t. Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Generalized assertions lacking the support of particularized 
cita tion required by Rule 56 do not su ffice , as a court has no "ob ligation to  'w ade 
th rough ' the record fo r specific fa c ts "  in support of a party 's  arguments. United  
States v. W RW Corp., 986 F.2d 138, 143 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing InterRoyal Corp. 
v. Sponse/ler, 889  F.2d 108 (6th Cir. 1989)).
3 A lthough filed e ighty days a fte r Defendants' M otion fo r Summary Judgm ent, 
P la in tiff's  Memorandum in Opposition w as tim e ly filed. On Ju ly 5, 2012 , she filed 
an Unopposed M otion fo r Extension o f Time to prepare a response to the 
Defendants' M otion fo r Summary Judgm ent due to  incomplete discovery. Doc. 
#19. The Court sustained th is m otion, thereby extending the due date for 
P la in tiff's  Memorandum in Opposition until September 13, 2012 .
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The m ovant "a lw ays bears the initia l responsib ility o f inform ing the d is tric t
court of the basis fo r its m otion, and identify ing those portions o f [the record] 
w hich it believes dem onstrate the absence of a genuine issue o f material fa c t."  
Celotex Corp. v. C atrett, A l l  U.S. 317 , 323 (1986). The m ovant's  burden is to 
dem onstrate "the  absence o f a genuine issue o f material fa c t as to  at least one 
essential element on each o f the P la in tiff's  c la im s." Johnson v. Univ. o f  
Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 572 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Celotex, 477  U.S. at 322).
Once the moving party has dem onstrated tha t no disputed issue o f material 
fa c t exists, the burden sh ifts to  the nonm oving party to  present evidence o f a 
genuine dispute o f a material fa c t th a t is resolvable only by a jury. Celotex, 477 
U.S. at 324. A t this stage, it is not su ffic ien t fo r the nonmoving party to  "sim ply 
show tha t there is some m etaphysical doubt as to  the material fa c ts ."  M atsushita  
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475  U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, the 
nonm oving party m ust "go beyond the pleadings" and present some type of 
evidentiary material th a t dem onstrates the existence of a genuine dispute. 
Celotex, A l l  U.S. at 324. "The mere existence of a scintilla o f evidence in 
support o f the p la in tiff's  position w ill be insu ffic ien t; there m ust be evidence on 
w hich the jury could reasonably find  fo r the p la in tiff."  Anderson v. L iberty Lobby, 
Inc., A l l  U.S. 242, 252  (1986).
Summary judgm ent m ust be entered "against a party who fa ils to  make a 
show ing su ffic ien t to  establish the existence of an element essential to  tha t party 's  
case, and on w hich th a t party w ill bear the burden of proof at tr ia l."  Celotex, A l l
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U.S. at 322. Conversely, material facts  in genuine dispute th a t "m ay reasonably 
be resolved in favor of either pa rty " require denial o f summary judgm ent in order to  
be properly resolved by a jury. Anderson, A l l  U.S. at 250.
When ruling on a m otion fo r summary judgm ent, a court m ust assume as 
true the evidence o f the nonmoving party and draw  all reasonable inferences in 
tha t pa rty 's  favor. Id. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398  U.S. 144, 
158-59 (1970)). A court m ust avoid "[c jred ib ility  determ inations, the weighing of 
the evidence, and the drawing o f legitim ate inferences from  the fa c ts ,"  as such are 
"ju ry  func tions" th a t are inappropriate to  employ at the summary judgm ent stage. 
Anderson, A l l  U.S. at 255.
IV. Analysis
Haley's discrim ination claims are based on circum stantia l and indirect 
evidence. Her com plaint alleges no acts o f d irect d iscrim ination by her employer, 
and she concedes in her Memorandum in Opposition tha t her claims are based only 
on circum stantia l evidence of d iscrim ination. Doc. #22 at 21. Because d irect 
evidence o f d iscrim ination is rare, "v ic tim s o f em ploym ent d iscrim ination are 
perm itted to  establish the ir cases through inferentia l and circum stantia l p roo f." 
Kline v. Tenn. Valley A u th ., 128 F. 3d 337, 348 (6th Cir. 1997). Therefore, 
Haley's claims under the AD A, ADEA, and the FMLA w ill be analyzed under the 
burden sh ifting  method established by the Supreme Court in M cD onnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and Tex. Dept, o f  Comm. A ffa irs  v. Burdine,
450  U.S. 248 (1981). See Geiger v. Tower A u to ., 579 F.3d 614  (6th Cir. 2009) 
(applying M cD onnell Douglas-Burdlne  fram ew ork to  age d iscrim ination claims 
brought under the ADEA);4 D augherty v. Sajar Plastics, Inc., 544  F.3d 696, 703 
(6th Cir. 2008) (applying M cD onnell Douglas-Burdine  to  em ploym ent disability 
d iscrim ination claims brought under the ADA); Bryson v. Regis Corp., 498  F.3d 
561, 570 (6th Cir. 2007) (applying "tripa rtite  burden-shifting fram ew ork" to FMLA 
retaliation claims based on circum stantia l evidence); Donald  v. Sybra, Inc., 667
F.3d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 2012) (stating tha t, based on prior S ixth C ircuit holdings, 
M cD onnell Douglas-Burdine  applies to  both interference and retaliation claims under 
the FMLA).
The M cD onnell Douglas-Burdine  burden sh ifting  analysis unfolds in three
steps:
First, the p la in tiff has the burden o f proving by the preponderance of 
the evidence a prima facie case o f d iscrim ination. Second, if the
4 In Geiger, the S ixth C ircuit interpreted the Supreme C ourt's  decision in Gross v. 
FBL Financial Services, 557 U.S. 167 (2009), as a rejection of the burden sh ifting 
analysis o f Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490  U.S. 228 (1989), when applied to  
ADEA claims based on direct evidence of d iscrim ination, not claims based on 
indirect or c ircum stantia l evidence. Geiger, 579 F.3d at 622 (stating "[tjh u s , 
Gross overrules our ADEA precedent to  the exten t tha t cases applied Title  V l l ’s 
burden-shifting fram ew ork if the p la in tiff produced direct evidence o f age 
d iscrim ination"). Notably, the Supreme Court "has not defin ite ly decided" the 
question o f w hether the M cD onnell Douglas-Burdine  burden sh ifting analysis 
applies to  ADEA claims based on circum stantia l evidence of d iscrim ination. Gross, 
557 U.S. at 175 n.2; see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 
133, 141-42 (2000) (applying M cD onnell Douglas-Burdine  analysis to  ADEA claim 
in light o f its w idespread application by Courts of Appeals although issue "no t 
squarely addressed" by the Supreme Court). Thus, in the S ixth C ircuit, "the 
M cD onnell Douglas fram ew ork can still be used to  analyze ADEA claims based on 
circum stantia l evidence." Geiger, 579 F.3d at 622.
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p la in tiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden [o f going 
fo rw ard ] sh ifts  to  the defendant " to  articu late some legitim ate, 
nondiscrim inatory reason fo r the em ployee's re jection." Third, should 
the defendant carry th is burden, the p la in tiff m ust then have an 
opportun ity  to  prove by a preponderance o f the evidence tha t the 
legitim ate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, 
but were a p re text fo r d iscrim ination.
Burdine, 450  U.S. at 252-53  (citing and quoting M cD onnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 
792, 802, 804 (1973)) (cita tions om itted). The S ixth C ircuit has described the 
particular application o f M cD onnell Douglas-Burdine  in the summary judgm ent 
con text as fo llow s:
On a m otion fo r sum m ary judgm ent, a d is tr ic t court considers w hether 
there is su ffic ien t evidence to  create a genuine dispute at each stage 
of the M cD onnell Douglas inquiry. The court firs t determ ines if a 
p la in tiff has put fo rth  su ffic ien t evidence fo r a reasonable ju ry  to  find 
her to have m et the prima facie requirements, including w hether she 
has met the legitim ate expectations of her employer. It performs the 
same function  w ith  respect to  defendant's production o f evidence, 
and again fo r the p la in tiff's  response to  th a t production.
Cline v. Catholic Diocese o f  Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 661 (6th Cir. 2000).
This fram ew ork is also appropriate fo r the analysis o f Haley's state law
claims of age and d isability  d iscrim ination. See Coryell Bank One Trust Co., N .A .,
803 N.E.2d 781, 786, 2004-O hio-723 1 15 (Ohio 2004) (stating th a t while Ohio
courts are "no t bound to  apply federal court in terpretation o f federal sta tu tes to
analogous Ohio sta tu tes, we have looked to  federal case law  when considering
claims of em ploym ent discrim ination brought under the Ohio Revised Code").
The Court w ill f irs t examine the basis fo r each o f Haley's prima facie claims
under the ADEA, the AD A, and the FMLA. If Haley is able to  make out a prima
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facie case fo r any of these claims, the Court w ill then examine any legitim ate, non- 
d iscrim inatory reasons put fo rth  by SRMC fo r her discipline and term ination. The 
Court w ill then examine those reasons in light of the undisputed evidence and 
determ ine if a reasonable ju ry  m ight find them pretextual. If a genuine issue o f 
material fa c t exists, the Court w ill be unable to  enter summary judgm ent.
A. Age Discrimination Claims
The ADEA prohibits an em ployer from  discharging or d iscrim inating against 
an individual in the "com pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em ploym ent" 
because o f his or her age. 29. U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). Age discrim ination claims 
brought under the analogous Ohio Civil Rights s ta tu te  are analyzed according to  
federal law , so Haley's state law  claim w ill not require a separate analysis. Peters 
v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 285 F.3d 456 , 469  (6th Cir. 2002). A successful age 
discrim ination claim requires the p la in tiff " to  establish tha t age was the 'bu t-fo r 
cause' o f the em ployer's adverse action ." Gross v. FBLA Fin. Serv., 557 U.S. 
167, 177 (2009).
1. Haley sats ifies the firs t three elem ents o f a prim a facie case o f  
age discrim ination under the ADEA.
A prima facie show ing o f age d iscrim ination under the ADEA requires a 
p la in tiff to  dem onstrate tha t: "1) she was a member o f the protected class, 2) she 
w as subject to  an adverse em ploym ent action, 3) she was qualified fo r the 
position, and 4) she was replaced by someone outside the protected class."
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M artin  v. Toledo Cardiology Consultants, Inc., 548 F.3d 405, 4 1 0  (6th Cir. 2009). 
The protections of the ADEA apply to  persons 40  years of age and older. 29 
U.S.C. § 631 (a). Haley was 58 at the tim e of her discharge, and thus satisfies the 
firs t element. Doc. #1 t  38; Doc. #3 1 38. Discharge, if done because o f an 
em ployee's age, is one o f the enumerated practices prohibited under the ADEA, 
and is unquestionably an adverse em ploym ent action. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). 
Indeed, a discharge fo r any purpose is an adverse em ploym ent action. Haley's 
discharge is not in dispute, and she thus satisfies the second prong of the prima 
facie case. Doc. #3 f  37.
Haley also meets the th ird  element o f the prima facie case. She was a 
registered nurse and worked fo r nearly 32 years in her profession. Doc. #3 f t  19- 
20. SRMC's Answ er admits th a t Haley "m e t the m inimum qualifications fo r her 
positions but had been a progressively poor performer prior to  her te rm ina tion ." 
Doc. #3 f  49. For purposes o f the prima facie inquiry, the only relevant part of 
SRMC's admission is tha t Haley was qualified. "[W ]hen assessing w hether a 
p la in tiff has m et her em ployer's legitim ate expectations at the prima facie stage of 
a term ination case, a court m ust examine p la in tiff's  evidence independent o f the 
nondiscrim inatory reason 'p roduced ' by the  defense as its reason fo r term inating 
p la in tiff."  Cline, 206  F.3d at 660-61 . Discharge fo r good cause is a non­
d iscrim inatory basis fo r term ination. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(3). Thus, w hether or not 
Haley was a "poor perform er" goes to  a ju s t cause, nondiscrim inatory basis fo r her
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discharge. SRMC's admission tha t Haley m et its standards is therefore adequate 
fo r her to  show  tha t she was qualified fo r the position.
2. Haley satisfies the fourth  e lem ent o f  an ADEA claim  by show ing  
tha t SRMC replaced he r w ith  a younger person.
The fourth  element o f a prima facie age discrim ination claim requires the 
p la in tiff to  show th a t a "substantia lly  younger" person replaced her. O 'C onnor v. 
Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308 , 313 (1996). For purposes of the 
fou rth  element o f a p la in tiff's  prima facie case based on indirect evidence, "an age 
d ifference of six years or less between an employee and a replacement is not 
s ign ifican t." Grosjean v. F irst Energy Corp., 349  F.3d 332, 340  (6th Cir. 2003). 
Replacement occurs "on ly when another employee is hired or reassigned to 
perform  the p la in tiff's  du ties." Id. at 336 (quoting Barnes v. GenCorp, Inc., 896 
F.2d 1465 (6th Cir. 1990)). Barbara Elliot, Haley's supervisor at the tim e o f her 
term ination, stated tha t Haley's "rep lacem ent," Rob Koval, "w as a lateral move 
from  another RN already employed in the operating room w ho was interested in 
cardiac surgery, and transitioned into her role on the Cardiac Team ." Doc. #17 at 
53. Id. Koval was born in 1965. Doc. #16 -4  at 11. In addition, Elianna Dawson, 
the firs t person hired after term inating Haley, was born in 1987. Id. As Haley was 
born in 1951, a ju ry  could reasonably believe th a t SRMC did replace Haley w ith  a 
s ign ificantly  younger person.
SRMC argues th a t because Haley's duties "were spread among the 
remaining em ployees" at SRMC, she was not "rep laced" in the legal sense required
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fo r the fou rth  element o f a prima facie age d iscrim ination claim. SRMC cites Lilley 
v. BTM  Corp., 958 F.2d 746, 752 (6th Cir. 1992), in w hich the p la in tiff's  
commission-based sales position was elim inated a fte r the employer suffered a 
"dow ntu rn  in the m arket" and the cancellation of several large orders. In Lilley, a 
reduction in force case, the S ixth C ircuit stated th a t "[s ipreading the form er duties 
of a term inated employee among the remaining employees does not constitu te  
replacem ent" th a t satisfies the fou rth  element o f a p la in tiff's  prima facie age 
discrim ination claim. Id. at 752. This re flects the heightened evidentiary burden a 
p la in tiff bears in a reduction in force case, w hich requires tha t she present 
"additional d irect, c ircum stantia l, or sta tis tica l evidence tending to  indicate tha t the 
employer singled out the p la in tiff fo r discharge fo r impermissible reasons." Barnes 
v. GenCorp, Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1465 (6th Cir. 1990); see also Geiger v. Tower 
A u to ., 579 F.3d 614, 623 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding th a t the p la in tiff's  "discharge 
and fa ilure to  be re-hired arose from  a w ork  force reduction" and therefore "m ust 
meet a heightened standard to  establish a prima facie case"). SRMC does not 
claim th a t Haley was term inated based on any reduction in force at its facilities. 
Furthermore, E lliot's deposition contrad icts SRMC's assertion tha t "duties were 
absorbed by another member o f the cardiac team w ith  her same job c lassifica tion" 
because she stated tha t Koval, Haley's "rep lacem ent," had no role on the Cardiac 
Team prior to  Haley's term ination. Doc. #26 ; Doc. #17 at 53.
The fac ts  surrounding Haley's replacement are also clouded by several 
inaccuracies tha t Haley points to  in SRMC's responses to  P la in tiff's  Interrogatories.
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Doc. #22. In response to  Haley's request fo r identifica tion o f all persons w ho 
performed her job duties after term ination, SMRC provided a lis t of 13 d iffe rent 
individuals. Doc. #16 -4  at 11. However, according to  E lliot's deposition, at least 
one o f those persons, Jamie Tuttle , did not w ork in the operating room at all. Doc. 
#17 at 55. SMRC's lis t stated tha t another person who performed Haley's duties 
was Elizabeth Sprinkle, and th a t Sprinkle started w orking at SMRC in 2008. Doc. 
#16 -4  at 11. However, Elliot stated tha t Sprinkle did not begin working at SRMC 
until 2010 , and, at the tim e she started, Sprinkle was a student nurse w itho u t 
licensure. Doc. #17 at 56 -57 . The Court notes another contradiction between 
SRMC's list and E lliot's testim ony. SRMC identifies Kelly U zlik 's date of hire as 
May 14, 2008 , but Elliot stated tha t Uzlik had not been hired before Haley's 
term ination in April o f 2010 , and th a t Uzlik never worked fo r Eliot in the operating 
room. Doc. #16 -4  at 11; Doc. #17 at 56.
Based on the contradictions between E lliot's statem ents and SRMC's data, 
the Court concludes tha t there are genuinely disputed facts  regarding Haley's 
replacement. Construing them  in the light m ost favorable to  Haley, and bearing in 
mind Elliot's specific identifica tion of Koval as Haley's replacement, the Court 
cannot rule as a m atter o f fa c t or o f law  tha t she was not "replaced" by a 
s ign ificantly  younger person, as SRMC contends.
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3. Haley also satisfies the fourth  elem ent o f  her ADEA claim  
because a reasonable ju ry  m igh t conclude tha t SRMC gave 
more favorable trea tm ent to younger employees.
A p la in tiff may also dem onstrate the fou rth  element of a prima facie case of 
age d iscrim ination by show ing th a t the employer gave more favorable trea tm ent to  
sim ilarly-situated non-protected employees. Minadeo v. ICI Paints, 398  F.3d 751, 
764  (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Clayton v. M eijer, Inc., 281 F.3d 605, 610  (6th Cir. 
2002)). Haley claims th a t tw o  younger employees, Amanda D illow  and Rick 
Parker, received more favorable treatm ent. Doc #18 at 24. SRMC adm its tha t 
D illow  incurred tw e lve  absences and ten tardies in the one year period before 
Haley's term ination, resulting in her placem ent only at CAP 1, the low est 
d iscip linary step, w hich is essentially an oral warning. Doc. #13 at 13. Haley, 
w ith  eleven tardies and four unexcused absences, was placed at CAP 4 and 
term inated. Doc. #15-1 .
Rick Parker, w ho was born in 1963, incurred seven tardies by April o f 2010 , 
was in itia lly  placed on CAP 4 and also faced term ination. Doc. #22-3 . Four of 
Parker's seven tardies were fo r clocking in one m inute after his sh ift was to  start. 
Id. f  7. A fte r complaining to  both Elliot and Abraham, Parker was placed on CAP 
2 and no longer faced term ination. Id. f t  11-14; Doc. #22-1 at 6. Haley also 
clocked in one m inute late four tim es, but her tardies were not excused and 
resulted in term ination. Doc. #15-1 at 1, Doc. #e17 at 169. W ith  attendance 
vio la tions tha t equaled or exceeded Haley's vio lations, SRMC term inated neither 
employee and placed them  at low er discip linary steps than Haley. A reasonable
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ju ry could determ ine tha t SRMC treated D illow  and Parker more favorably than 
Haley, and there is therefore a genuine issue of material fa c t as to  the fou rth  
element o f Haley's prima facie case o f age discrim ination.
SRMC believes tha t Haley cannot show more favorable trea tm ent of younger 
people fo r tw o  reasons. First, SRMC argues th a t "corrective action and discipline 
over attendance were not unique to "  Haley because over f i f ty  percent o f E lliot's 
s ta ff also faced "some level of corrective action ." Doc. #26 at 4. However, Haley 
does not argue th a t she was the only employee who faced discipline. The fac t 
tha t SRMC disciplined all o f its employees, or tha t half o f them  faced some type of 
action based on attendance, does not mean th a t the hospital did not trea t some 
employees more or less favorably than others. SRMC does not po in t to  an 
example in the record of another employee it term inated w ith  an attendance record 
comparable to  Haley's or o therw ise show  th a t younger employees were not treated 
more favorably. Haley has pointed to  evidence to  the contrary, and tha t is 
adequate to  establish her prima facie case.
SRMC also argues tha t D illow  was not term inated "due to  E lliot's failure to 
keep track  o f a ttendance." Doc. #26  at 4. As w ith  SRMC's contention tha t 
Haley's poor perform ance justified  her discharge, th is is a nondiscrim inatory reason 
fo r Haley's term ination th a t is not appropriately considered at the prima facie 
stage. See Cline v. Catholic Diocese o f  Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 660-61 (6th Cir. 
2000). Based on the foregoing, and bearing in mind th a t Haley's burden at the 
prima facie stage "is not onerous," the Court finds tha t she has established the
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fou r elements of her age discrim ination claim required to  proceed to  the second 
stage of the M cD onnell Douglas-Burdine analysis. Tex. Dept, o f  Comm. A ffa irs  v. 
Burdine, 450  U.S. 248 , 253 (1981).
B. Disability Discrimination Claims
The Americans w ith  Disabilities A c t o f 1990 ("A D A ") prohibits an employer 
from  "d iscrim inat[ing ] against a qualified individual on the basis o f d isab ility  in 
regard to  . . . the hiring, advancement, or discharge o f employees . . . and other 
term s, conditions, and privileges of em ploym ent." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). As w ith  
her age d iscrim ination claims, Haley's state law  disability d iscrim ination claim may 
be evaluated under standards applicable to  her federal claim. See Columbus C ivil 
Serv. Comm'r. v. McGlone, 697 N.E.2d 204, 206-07  (Ohio 1998) (stating tha t the 
Supreme Court of Ohio "can look to  regulations and cases interpreting the [ADA] 
fo r guidance in our in terpretation of Ohio law ").
In the S ixth C ircuit, a prima facie case o f d isability d iscrim ination based on 
indirect evidence requires the p la in tiff to  show  tha t 1) he or she is disabled; 2) w ith  
or w ith o u t reasonable accom m odation, the p la in tiff is o therw ise qualified fo r the 
position; 3) the p la in tiff suffered an adverse em ploym ent decision; 4) the employer 
knew or had reason to  know  of the p la in tiff's  d isability ; and 5) the disabled 
individual was replaced. W hitfie ld  v. Tenn., 639  F.3d 253, 259 (6th Cir. 2011) 
(citing M acy v. Hopkins Cnty. Sch. Bd. o f  Educ., 484  F.3d 357, 364-65  (6th Cir. 
2007)). The threshold question, w hether or not Haley was "disabled" under the
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ADA, is the only prima facie elem ent o f her claim tha t SRMC challenges. Doc. #13 
at 11-15.
The ADA defines d isab ility  in three ways: "(A) a physical or mental 
im pairm ent th a t substantia lly lim its one or more major life activ ities o f such 
individual; (B) a record o f such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such 
an impairm ent . . . ." 42  U.S.C. § 12102(1). An im pairm ent includes "[a ]ny
physiological disorder or condition , cosm etic disfigurem ent, or anatomical loss 
a ffecting one or more body system s, such as neurological, m usculoskeletal, special 
sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, 
d igestive, genitourinary, immune, circula tory, hemic, lym phatic, skin, and 
endocrine . . . ."  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). Ohio law  tracks these examples of 
impairm ent, but specifica lly includes cancer as w ell. Ohio Rev. Code § 
4112.01  (1 6)(a)(iii). Haley's cancer was a physiological condition affecting multiple 
body systems and was treated by a m astectom y, resulting in an anatomical loss. 
It unquestionably qualifies as an impairm ent under the ADA. See Ellison v. 
S oftw are  Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 190 (5th Cir. 1996) (analyzing ADA 
disability claim based on im pairm ent o f p la in tiff's  breast cancer).
However, the recognition o f a p la in tiff's  im pairm ent is only a threshold issue 
in determ ining w hether or not she has a d isability under the ADA. When Congress 
passed the ADA Am endm ent A cts  o f 2008  ("A D A A A "), it amended the sta tu te  
w ith  specific rules of construction fo r defining a d isab ility . AD A Am endm ents A c t 
of 2008 , Pub. L. 110-315 ; 42  U.S.C. § 12102(4). These rules of construction
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state tha t defin itions of d isability are to  be drawn "in  favor of broad coverage of 
individuals . . .  to  the maximum exten t perm itted" by the s ta tu te. 42  U.S.C. § 
12102(4)(A ). Therefore, when analyzing w hether an im pairm ent "substantia lly  
lim its " an individual's major life ac tiv ity , courts should in terpret tha t phrase in 
accordance w ith  the findings and purposes of the A D A A A . Id. § 12102(4)(B). In 
passing the A D AAA, Congress intended to  "sta te  a broad scope of protection to  be 
available under the A D A " and specifica lly reject the "inappropriately high" 
standards fo r interpreting the term  "substantia lly  lim its " articulated by the Supreme 
Court in Sutton v. United A ir  Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and Toyota M o to r M fg ., 
Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002). Pub. L. 110-315.
The A D A A A  also provides th a t "[a ]n  im pairm ent th a t is episodic or in 
remission is a d isability if it w ould substantially lim it a major life ac tiv ity  when 
ac tive ." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D ). Major life activ ities include w orking, id. § 
12102(2)(A ). A major life a c tiv ity  may also include "the operation o f a major 
bodily func tion " such as "norm al cell g row th  . . . ." id. § 12102(2)(B). Thus, the 
Equal Employment O pportun ity Commission, applying the principles of construction 
described above, states th a t " it  should be easily concluded" tha t cancer, as an 
impairment, substantia lly  lim its the major life ac tiv ity  of normal cell g row th . 29
C.F.R. § 1 6 3 0 .2 (j)(3 )(iii).
M indful o f Congress's mandate to  construe the AD A broadly when defining 
a d isability  and the non-onerous burden on the p la in tiff at the initial stage of the 
McDonneiTDougias-Burdine  analysis, the Court finds th a t a reasonable ju ry  could
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conclude tha t Haley was disabled under the ADA, and therefore fu lfills  the firs t 
element of her prima facie claim. She was obviously disabled when the cancer 
was active, as it substantia lly lim ited the major life ac tiv ity  o f normal cell g row th. 
In addition, the cancer substantia lly lim ited the major life ac tiv ity  of her work. 
Haley took extensive tim e o ff fo r surgery and recuperation between the end of 
November 2009  and January 18, 2010 , during w hich tim e she could not w ork  at 
all. Doc. #18 at 33; Doc. #1 8 -5 4  at 5-6. When Haley did return to  w ork, her 
a c tiv ity  was substantia lly lim ited by in itia lly  being restricted to  half days. Doc #3 1 
7. If her cancer were to  recur and become active again, it would again 
substantia lly lim it the tw o  areas o f major life ac tiv ity  of w ork  and normal cell 
g row th . Other courts have reached the same conclusion when a p la in tiff's  prima 
facie case states th a t cancer, a lthough in remission, is the basis fo r defining her 
d isability  under the ADA. See Katz v. Adecco USA, Inc., 845 F.Supp.2d 539, 548 
(S.D.N.Y 2012) (stating tha t as "a result o f the amendments to  the ADA, it 
appears not to  m atter tha t [the p la in tiff's ] cancer was in remission at the tim e of 
the alleged d iscrim ination"); N orton  v. A ssis ted  Living Concepts, Inc., 786  F.Supp. 
2d 1173 (E.D. Tex. 2011) (holding th a t renal cancer could be classified as 
d isability  under the ADA); H offm an v. Carefirst o f  Fort Wayne, Inc., 737 F.Supp. 
2d 976, 985 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (holding tha t cancer in remission constitu tes 
d isability based upon the "clear language" o f 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D)); see also 
A nge ll v. Fairm ount Fire Prot. D is t., No. 11 -c v -0 3 0 2 5 -C M A -C B S , 2012  WL
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5 3 89 7 7 7  (D.Colo. Nov. 5, 2012); Unangst v. Dual Temp Co., Inc., No. 10-6811, 
201 2 WL 9311 30 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 1 9, 201 2).
SRMC presents several reasons w hy it believes Haley cannot meet the firs t 
elem ent o f a prima facie d isability d iscrim ination claim. First, SRMC claims tha t 
Haley has no d irect evidence o f d isab ility , pointing to  Haley's response of "no " 
during her deposition when asked "do you consider yourself disabled?" and "are 
you disabled?" Doc. #13 at 12. SRMC misunderstands the basis o f Haley's claim, 
w hich  is indirect or c ircum stantia l evidence. A lack of d irect evidence is therefore 
not fa ta l to  Haley's claim . Furthermore, Haley's statem ents are not particularly 
probative of the determ ination o f w hether she is disabled under the ADA, w hich is 
a legal defin ition quite d is tinc t from  the colloquial meaning of "d isab led." This 
Court has reached the conclusion th a t a reasonable jury could conclude tha t Haley 
was disabled, as defined under the A D A , only after consulting the technical 
specifications o f the s ta tu te, regulations, and relevant case law. None o f those 
authorities require a p la in tiff to  a ffirm a tive ly  se lf-iden tify  as "disabled" in order to  
meet the legal de fin ition  o f having a d isab ility  under the ADA.
Second, SRMC argues tha t Haley cannot "succeed on a theory o f perceived 
d isab ility " -  presumably a reference to  the option o f a p la in tiff to  show  tha t she 
was "regarded as" having an im pairm ent under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1 )(C). Doc. 
#13 at 15. Because the Court finds th a t a reasonable jury could conclude tha t she 
was disabled under 42  U.S.C. § 1 2 10 2 (1 )(A), Haley need not also show  tha t she
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was "regarded as having [] an im pairm ent" under Subsection C o f the sta tu te. The 
requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) are disjunctive.
Even if Haley had brought a "regarded as" disabled claim, SRMC's argument 
w ould be unconvincing because of its basis on overruled authority. Doc. #13 at 
1 5. SRMC asserts th a t to  make out a claim based on a perception o f d isab ility , the 
th ird  prong o f 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1 ), Haley "m ust show  [that] SRMC regarded her 
as being substantia lly lim ited in perform ing either a class of jobs or a broad range 
of jobs in various classes," citing  S utton  v. United A ir  Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 
489  (1999). Id. When enacting the A D A A A , Congress expressly stated th a t one 
of its purposes was "to  re ject the Supreme C ourt's reasoning in Sutton v. United 
A ir Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) w ith  regard to  coverage under the th ird  prong  
o f de fin ition  o f d isab ility "  and to  restore previous reasoning in line w ith  the 
"de fin ition  o f handicap under the Rehabilitation A c t o f 19 73 ." Pub. L. 110-315  § 
2(b)(3) (emphasis added). We also have the benefit of the S ixth C ircu it's  
explanation in M ilho lland v. Sum ner C ounty Board o f  Education, 569 F.3d 562, 
566 (6th Cir. 2009), tha t " [tjh e  amended version of the ADA no longer requires 
the p la in tiff bringing a claim under subpart (C) to  show  tha t the im pairm ent lim ited 
her life ac tiv ity , including w orking in a broad class o f jobs ." SRMC's reliance on 
case law  from  outside the S ixth  C ircuit predating the AD AAA amendments and 
applying case law  overruled by those amendments is equally unpersuasive. Doc. 
#13 at 14-15 (citing Giordano v. N ew  York, 274  F.3d 740  (2nd Cir. 2001) 
(applying Sutton) and Treiber v. Lindeberg Sch. D is t., 199 F.Supp. 2d 949, 959-60
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(E.D. Mo. 2002) (applying Toyota)). "In c iting authorities, the Court prefers tha t 
counsel rely upon cases decided by the Supreme Court o f the United States, the 
United States Court o f Appeals fo r the S ixth C ircuit (or, in appropriate cases, the 
Federal C ircuit), the Supreme Court o f Ohio, and th is  C ourt." S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 
7.2(b)(2).
Other than the "disabled" element, SRMC does not challenge any other 
element of Haley's prima facie case of d isability  d iscrim ination. Doc. #13 at 12- 
14. The Court interprets these omissions as SRMC's concession, fo r purposes of 
its m otion, tha t Haley can show the other elements of her prima facie case o f such 
discrim ination. Because the Court has determ ined tha t a ju ry  could reasonably 
conclude th a t Haley was disabled under the ADA, SRMC is not entitled to 
summary judgm ent on her ADA or state law  claims fo r d isability d iscrim ination for 
failure to  make a prima facie case. Her claims therefore survive the firs t stage of 
the M cD onne ll Douglas-Burdine  analysis.
C. Claims for Interference and Retaliation under the FMLA
The Family and Medical Leave A c t ("FM LA") was enacted to  help employees 
balance the ir fam ilies ' needs w ith  "the demands of the w orkp lace" and to  allow 
them  "to  take reasonable leave fo r medical reasons . . . and fo r the care of a child, 
spouse, or parent w ho has a serious health cond ition ." 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b). 
During any tw e lve-m onth  period, the FMLA provides an employee w ith  the right to 
tw e lve  weeks of leave "[b jecause of a serious health condition th a t makes the
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employee unable to  perform the func tions" of his or her job. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(D). 
The employee may also take leave, counted tow ards the same tw e lve  week period, 
in order to  care fo r a spouse or parent w ith  a serious health condition. Id. § 
2612(a)(1)(C).
The S ixth C ircu it has recognized " tw o  d is tinc t theories of recovery under the 
FM LA." Hoge v. Honda o f  Am . M fg ., Inc., 384  F.3d 238, 244 (6th Cir. 2004). 
The firs t is the "in te rfe rence" or "en titlem en t" theory. It is based on 29 U.S.C. § 
2615(a)(1), w h ich  states tha t " [ i] t  shall be un law fu l fo r any employer to  interfere 
w ith , restrain, or deny the exercise o f or the a ttem pt to  exercise, any right 
provided under th is  subchapter." The second theory o f recovery involves FMLA 
"re ta lia tion" or "d iscrim ina tion" claims. These arise under 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2), 
w hich prohibits employers from  discharging or o therw ise discrim inating against 
individuals w ho oppose unlaw fu l FMLA practices. In this case, P la in tiff has 
asserted both an interference claim and a retaliation claim under the FMLA.
1. Haley sta tes a claim fo r in terference under the FMLA.
A p la in tiff 's  prima facie interference claim requires her to  show  th a t "(1) she 
was an eligible employee, (2) the defendant was an employer as defined under the 
FMLA, (3) she w as entitled to  leave under the FMLA, (4) she gave the employer 
notice o f her in tention to  take leave, and (5) the employer denied the employee 
FMLA benefits to  w hich she was en titled ." Edgar v. JAC  Prod, Inc., 443  F.3d 
501, 507 (6th Cir. 2006).
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SRMC's arguments attack the fourth  and f if th  elements o f Haley's prima
facie case.5 The fourth  element is the crucial one, however, because, if Haley
gave proper notice o f her intention to  take leave on February 12, 2010 , then
SRMS's categorization of tha t tim e o ff as "unexcused" supports a claim tha t she
was denied the benefit o f tha t leave. Thus, an initial assessment m ust be made of
the requirements fo r "no tice " under the FMLA and w hether a reasonable jury could
find tha t Haley's actions amounted to su ffic ien t notice.
The FMLA only addresses notice in cases o f "foreseeable leave," such as the
leave required fo r an expected child or planned medical treatm ent. 29 U.S.C. §
2612(e). The FM LA's implementing regulations, however, do address notice
requirements fo r unforeseeable leave. 29 C.F.R. § 825 .303 . W ith  regard to
tim ing, "an employee m ust provide notice to  the employer as soon as practicable
under the facts  and circum stances of the particular case." Id. § 8 2 5 .3 0 3  (a). The
regulation also provides the fo llow ing  hypothetica l, particularly applicable here:
For example, if an em ployee's child has a severe asthma attack and 
the employee takes the child to  the emergency room, the employee 
would not be required to  leave his or her child in order to  report the 
absence w hile  the child is receiving em ergency treatm ent.
Id.
5 Haley's com pla int presents her FMLA retaliation and interference claims as 
stemming from  several acts by SMRC, w ith o u t specifying w hich particular act or 
acts form  the basis fo r her interference claim. Doc. #1 f  78. As SRMC points 
out, the categorization o f her February 12, 2010 , absence as unexcused instead of 
excused FMLA leave is the only cognizable basis fo r an interference claim. Doc. 
#13 at 18. Haley's Memorandum in Response to  SRMC's M otion fo r Summary 
Judgm ent concedes as much, as she only addresses the February 1 2, 2010 , 
absence and SRMC's treatm ent o f it in the con tex t o f her interference claim.
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Here, a reasonable ju ry  could certa in ly conclude tha t Haley's notice was 
tim ely. She was able to  report her absence w hile her husband was receiving 
medical treatm ent because o f the unusual fa c t th a t he was transported to  her 
employer, SRMC, fo r treatm ent. W hile there is some confusion as to  whom  
exactly she reported at the tim e ,6 it is undisputed th a t Haley contacted SRMC. 
Doc. #3 135. Haley's supervisor, Barb Elliot, knew  on tha t day tha t Haley was in 
the emergency room w ith  her husband. Doc. #17 at 76, 81. Haley states tha t 
she gave this notice by 6 :30  a.m. th a t day. Doc. #22-2  at 2.
The content o f the notice m ust also conta in "su ffic ien t in form ation fo r an 
employer to  reasonably determ ine w hether the FMLA may apply to the leave 
request." 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(b ). "The critica l question is w hether the
inform ation imparted to the employer is su ffic ien t to  reasonably apprise it o f the 
em ployee's request to  take tim e o ff fo r a serious health cond ition ." W alton v. Ford 
M o to r Co., 424  F.3d 481, 486  (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Brohm v. JH  Props., Inc., 
149 F.3d 517, 523 (6th Cir. 1998)). Furthermore, "[t]he  employer w ill be 
expected to obtain any additional required inform ation through inform al means." 
29 C.F.R. § 8 2 5 .3 0 3  (b). Here, Haley called her departm ent early th a t morning, 
informed SRMC th a t she was in the em ergency room w ith  her husband, and stated
6 According to  Haley's deposition, Rose W hite was the "desk person" on du ty  tha t 
morning, but Haley phoned before W hite arrived and asked tha t her message be 
relayed. Doc. #18  at 53-54 . W hite did not recall Haley's husband's
hospitalization (Doc. #25 at 11), but did confirm  th a t either she or Elliot would 
have been the person contacted in the event o f an employee's absence due to  an 
emergency (Doc. #25 at 12).
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tha t "I w o n 't be in to  w ork  until I find out w ha t's  going on w ith  h im ." Doc. #18 at 
54. Haley was nevertheless able to  w ork the next tw o  days o f the three tha t her 
husband spent in the hospital. Doc. #17 a79. Barb Elliot stated tha t she had been 
relayed the message tha t Haley was in SRMC's emergency room w ith  her husband. 
Id. at 81. Elliot also knew Haley's husband "had chest pa in ," w hich she agreed 
was a "serious medical cond ition ." Id. at 76. Elliot also did not make any a ttem pt 
to  con tact Haley tha t day. Id. A jury could reasonably conclude tha t Haley gave 
su ffic ient and tim e ly  notice th a t FMLA leave m ight apply to  her absence on 
February 12, 2010 , because SRMC knew of it the day it occurred and it concerned 
her husband's serious medical condition. For purposes of summary judgm ent, 
therefore, Haley can fu lfill the  fou rth  element o f a prima facie interference claim.
SRMC argues th a t Haley cannot establish the f ifth  element o f an FMLA 
interference claim because her com plaint "p la in ly aver[red]" th a t "she was granted 
all the FMLA leave she requested," precluding any allegation tha t she was denied a 
benefit provided by the s ta tu te . Doc. #13 at 18. This argument m isunderstands 
the nature o f Haley's FMLA claim , w hich is based on SRMC's classification o f her 
leave as unauthorized and her resulting term ination. This is evident from  Paragraph 
74 through paragraph 80 o f Haley's com plaint, wherein she alleges tha t SRMC 
"fa il[ed] to  categorize her leave as FMLA" after absences due to serious health 
conditions of herself, her m other, and her husband. Doc. #1.
More im portantly, fo r purposes of summary judgm ent, SRMC adm its to  the 
fo llow ing facts: Haley's husband was transported to  SRMC fo r his heart condition
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on February 12, 2010 ; Haley contacted SRMC regarding her absence; during the 
three days of her husband's hospita lization, Haley had no FMLA leave; and SRMC 
marked her absence on February 12, 2010 , as "unexcused." Doc. #3 1135, 41. 
Based on those undisputed fac ts , a ju ry  could reasonably conclude tha t SRMC 
denied Haley FMLA leave by categorizing her February 12, 2010 , absence as 
unexcused, and tha t she, therefore, has stated a prima facie claim fo r FMLA 
interference.
2. Haley sta tes a claim  fo r re ta lia tion under the FMLA.
For Haley to  make out a prima facie re ta lia tion/term ination claim under the 
FMLA, she m ust show  tha t 1) she availed herself o f a right protected under the 
FMLA, 2) she suffered an adverse em ploym ent action, and 3) a causal connection 
exists between the adverse action and the exercise o f her FMLA-protected right. 
See Edgar v. JA C  Products, Inc., 443  F.3d 501, 508 (6th Cir. 2006). The firs t 
tw o  elements o f the claim are satisfied. As detailed supra in Section I.A ., Haley 
availed herself o f FMLA leave m ultip le tim es in the year before her term ination and 
she was subject to  the adverse em ploym ent action o f term ination.
A reasonable ju ry  m ight also conclude th a t a causal connection existed 
between tha t FMLA leave and her term ination, w hich would satisy the th ird 
element of her prima facie case of FMLA retaliation or term ination. The S ixth 
C ircuit has held tha t " [p jro x im ity  in tim e between the protected ac tiv ity  and the 
adverse em ploym ent action may constitu te  evidence o f a causal connection."
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Bryson v. Regis, 498  F.3d 561, 571 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Skrjanc v. Great Lakes 
Power Serv. Co., 272 F.3d 309 , 314  (6th Cir. 2001)). In Bryson, the S ixth C ircuit 
found tha t the p la in tiff's  term ination on the day she returned from  three months of 
FMLA leave coupled w ith  statem ents th a t her employer was angry about the leave 
and th a t it intended to  term inate her sufficed to  make out a prima facie case fo r 
retaliation. Bryson, 498  F.3d at 571. Likewise, in Seeger v. C incinnati Bell 
Telephone Co., LLC, 681 F.3d 274, 283 (6th Cir. 2012), the p la in tiff satisfied "the 
low  threshold of proof necessary to  establish a prima facie case of retaliatory 
discharge" where the fac ts  showed he was term inated w ith in  three weeks of 
returning from  FMLA leave and tw o  m onths a fte r firs t notify ing the employer o f the 
need fo r leave.
Here, it is undisputed th a t Haley took " in te rm itte n t" FMLA leave on the 
fo llow ing  dates in 2010 : January 25 and 26, March 4 through March 12, and on 
April 15 and 16. Doc. #3 at f f  34, 36. Three days later, on Monday, April 19, 
SRMC term inated Haley. Doc. #13-1 at 2. The tem poral p rox im ity  o f her 
term ination to  the leave taken, particularly against the background o f the extensive 
leave taken in November and December o f 2009  and January o f 2010 , meet the 
threshold required to  state a prima facie case of retaliation. In addition, Elliot 
believed tha t Haley had lied to  her in the past about her use o f FMLA leave. Doc. 
#17 at 123-24. This com ports w ith  the level of proof considered adequate fo r 
stating a prima facie case in Bryson. Bryson, 498 F.3d at 571.
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SRMC believes th a t Haley cannot make out a prima facie case o f retaliation 
under the FMLA. It argues tha t Haley cannot "draw  a nexus between her 
term ination and her alleged use o f FMLA tim e ," because her February 12, 2010, 
absence was unexcused, not FMLA tim e. Doc. #13 at 19. However, th is is 
tauto logica l because, as stated above, Haley has made out a prima facie case tha t 
SRMC's categorization o f th a t tim e as unexcused interfered w ith  a s ta tu to ry  right. 
A reasonable ju ry  could also infer a causal connection between SRMC's decision to  
mark a day tha t Haley was entitled to  FMLA leave as unexcused and its 
te rm ination of Haley, because it relied in part on tha t unexcused absence when 
term inating her.
SRMC also challenges the inclusion o f events "outside the FM LA's 2 year 
s ta tu te  of lim itations fo r interference cla im s" on a timeline o f events in Haley's 
Memorandum in Opposition. Doc. #26 at 8. SRMC believes tha t Haley's mention 
of the FMLA leave she took in 2007  is an a ttem pt to apply a "continuing 
v io la tions" theory under the FMLA tha t is unsupported by S ixth C ircuit authority. 
Id. The Court believes tha t th is argum ent is illogical, as Haley alleges no violation 
in 2007 . The sta tu te  provides tha t "an action may be brought under th is section 
no t la te r than 2 years a fte r the date o f  the las t event constitu ting  the alleged  
violation  fo r w hich the action is b rough t." 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c) (emphasis added). 
Her tim eline mentions no adverse action taken by SRMC in 2007 , only the FMLA 
leave th a t Haley took. Her term ination in April o f 2010  was the " firs t material 
adverse action" taken by SRMC tha t justified  filing suit. Butler v. Owens-
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Brickaw ay Plastics Prod., Inc., 199 F.3d 314, 317 (6th Cir. 1999). Likewise, the 
sta tu te  o f lim ita tions would not be implicated by any FMLA violations a jury m ight 
recognize based on the tem poral p rox im ity  of SRMC's progressive discipline of 
Haley to  her FMLA leave during 2009. This is because only SRMC's term ination of 
Haley's em ploym ent was:
the firs t action serious enough to  w arrant p la in tiff's  resort to  the legal 
system . To hold otherw ise would force p la in tiffs  to  bring su it each 
tim e they are assessed a negative mark on the ir absentee record, but 
before th is mark results in probation, term ination, failure to  reinstate, 
or other adverse action. As [the p la in tiff notes], such a requirement 
w ould unnecessarily clog the federal courts w ith  premature claims.
Id.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds th a t Haley has presented evidence 
su ffic ien t fo r a reasonable jury to  conclude tha t she has stated prima facie cases 
fo r both interference and retaliation under the FMLA.
D. SRMC's Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reasons for Haley's 
Termination and Discipline
Haley's statem ent of a prima facie case of age discrim ination under the 
ADEA sh ifts  the burden of production to  SRMC "to  articulate some legitim ate, 
nondiscrim inatory reason" fo r her discharge. M cD onnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Excessive tardiness and absenteeism are
nondiscrim inatory reasons fo r term ination. See Weigel v. Baptist Hosp. o f East 
Tennessee, 302  F.3d 367, 378 -79  (6th Cir. 2002) (finding nurse's "system atic  
absenteeism " a legitim ate, nondiscrim inatory reason fo r discharge); Tow nley v.
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Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 254  F.Supp. 2d 661, 669 -70  (E.D. M ich. 2003) (citing
Weigel and find ing "excessive absenteeism and tard iness" legitim ate and 
nondiscrim inatory reasons fo r term ination o f claims processor).
Here, SRMC states th a t Haley was term inated "fo r a chronic pattern o f ta rdy 
arrival to  w ork and multiple unexcused absences" th a t violated its established 
attendance policy. Doc. #13 at 3; Doc. #13-2  at 4. The hospita l's policy states 
tha t " [a pp ro p ria te  corrective action up to  and including discharge may result when 
an associate 's attendance record is determ ined to  exceed acceptable standards." 
Doc. #13-1 at 15. The reasons are simple: in a hospital, employees w ith  tardiness 
and unexcused absences "create a hardship fo r other associates and im pact the 
delivery o f patient/resident care." Id. at 14. SRMC's interest in enforcing its 
attendance policies is underscored by its responsib ility to  its patients, w ho have 
literally placed the ir lives in the hospita l's  hands. V io lation of SRMC's attendance 
policy is an unquestionably legitim ate and nondiscrim inatory basis fo r jus t cause 
term ination.
Haley's discharge form  lists eleven dates tha t she was tardy between
November 5, 2009 , and April 6, 2010 , as well as fou r unexcused absences. Doc.
#13-1 at 2. The form  indicates tha t the "Type o f A c tion " taken is "D ischarge" and
provides as a "Reason fo r A c tio n " the fo llow ing :
During the past six months, Nancy has dem onstrated a chronic 
pattern o f ta rdy arrival and m ultip le unexcused absences. This is a 
vio la tion o f HR policy 12 .00  A ttendance. Nancy received inform ation 
regarding professional accountab ility  and the need to  be personally 
responsible fo r know ing the policies of the organization and w hat
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must be done to  adhere to  those policies during departm ent meetings 
held December 17, 2009  & March 18, 2010 .
Id. The Court finds th a t SRMC has satisfied its burden o f production. By pointing
to  Haley's vio lation o f its attendance policy though m ultiple absences and
instances o f tardiness, SRMC has articulated an unquestionably legitim ate and
nondiscrim inatory reason fo r term inating her em ploym ent.
In addition, SRMC placed Haley at the second and th ird stages of its
progressive d iscip linary policy prior to  term ination. SRMC's stated reasons fo r
taking those adverse em ploym ent actions against Haley, tha t she failed to  respond
to  pages while "on ca ll" and tha t she failed to  fo llo w  the hospita l's  policy for
patient surgical site marking, are both legitim ate and nondiscrim inatory. SRMC
paged Haley while she was on call, because physicians required the assistance of
Cardiac Team nurses to  operate on patients w ith  suddenly deteriorating conditions.
Doc. #15-3. D isciplining a nurse fo r late response or no response in such a life
threatening situation is unquestionably legitim ate. Furthermore, the hospita l's
"Universal Protocol Policy" on site marking puts in place careful procedures and
safeguards to  ensure th a t the proper surgical site is marked on a patient before any
invasive procedure is performed. See Doc. #16-3 . V iolation o f a policy in place to
prevent drastic medical error is an indisputably legitim ate and nondiscrim inatory
reason fo r discipline.
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E. A Reasonable Jury Could Find that SMRC's Reasons for Disciplining 
and Terminating Haley were Pretextual
A fte r an em ployer articu lates a legitim ate, nondiscrim inatory reason fo r its 
actions, the burden sh ifts  back to the p la in tiff, who m ust prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence tha t the em ployer's reasons are pretextual. 
Burdine, 450  U.S. at 253. To survive summary judgm ent, the p la in tiff m ust 
"produce!] evidence from  w hich a ju ry  could reasonably doubt the em ployer's 
explanation. If so, her prima facie case is su ffic ien t to  support an inference of 
d iscrim ination at tr ia l."  Chen v. D ow  Chem. Co., 580  F.3d 394, 400  n.4 (6th Cir. 
2009) (citing St. M a ry 's  H onor Ctr. v. H icks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993)). 
Conversely, "sum m ary judgm ent is proper if, based on the evidence presented, a 
ju ry  could not reasonably doubt the em ployer's exp lanation." Chen, 580  F.3d at 
400  n.4 (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530  U.S. 133, 148 
(2000)). The p la in tiff may prove pre text by show ing tha t the reasons offered by 
the defendant 1) had no basis in fac t; 2) were not the actual reasons fo r the 
defendant's actions; or 3) were an insu ffic ien t basis fo r the defendant's actions. 
M anzer v. D iamond Sham rock Chems., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir. 1994) 
(overruled on o ther grounds by  Geiger v. Tower A u to ., 579 F.3d 614  (6th Cir. 
2009)). Haley believes th a t a reasonable ju ry  w ould find  tha t SRMC's articulated 
reasons fo r her discipline and term ination were pretextual under each o f M anzer's 
three inquiries.
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7. A reasonable ju ry  m igh t question the fac tua l bases o f the site  
m arking inc idents and Haley's attendance violations.
A showing tha t the defendants ' reasons had no basis in fa c t is "easily 
recognizable and consists o f evidence tha t the proffered bases fo r the p la in tiff's  
discharge never happened, i.e ., th a t they are 'fac tua lly  fa lse .'"  Manzer, 29 F.3d at 
1084 (quoting Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1124 (7th Cir. 
1994)). Haley challenges the factua l bases supporting each disciplinary step 
SRMC placed her on before term ination and believes th a t a jury could "re jec t" each 
of them . Doc. #22 at 32-34 .
There is su ffic ien t dispute surrounding the tw o  patient site marking incidents 
from  w hich  a jury m ight conclude th a t no factua l basis supported placing Haley on 
the CAP 3 discipline step. The corrective  action form  describes tw o  incidents: a 
vio la tion fo r transporting a patient to  the operating room before the patient had 
been site marked and another fo r "a tte m p tin g ] to  mark the site herself" before 
other s ta ff paged the surgeon to  mark the site. Doc. #18 -52  at 1. Haley disputed 
tha t she ever marked or a ttem pted to  mark a pa tien t's  surgical site herself. Doc. 
#22 -2  at 1; Doc. #18-55  at 3-4. In the grievance filed w ith  her term ination, Haley 
stated th a t she offered to  take the patient to  the operating room fo r the physician 
to  site mark the patient there in order to  expedite the case, because the physician 
had been upset about a th irty  m inute delay in the procedure. Doc. #18-55  at 3-4.
Further com plicating the picture is SRMC's sta tem ent, in its Responses to  
P la in tiff's  Interrogatories, th a t Haley was term inated "w hen  she m ism arked a
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p a tien t fo r surgery  and failed to  respond tw ice  when she was on call as a surgical 
nurse." Doc. #16 -4  at 5 (emphasis added). SRMC( by stating tha t Haley 
"m ism arked" a patient, avers th a t Haley both marked a pa tien t's  surgical site 
herself and tha t she marked the site incorrectly . Yet E lliott, Haley's supervisor, 
stated in her deposition th a t Haley neither marked nor m ismarked a patient. Doc. 
#17 at 128. SRMC's statem ent not only contradicts E lliot's deposition, it alleges a 
more serious v io la tion: the actual m ismarking of the procedure site on a patient 
before surgery. Elliot also stated th a t Haley would not have been put on the CAP 
3 discip linary step fo r jus t one incident of offering to  site mark a patient, id. at 
131. Construing the foregoing in Haley's favor, genuine issues of material fac t 
exist as to  w hether th is  d iscip linary step had a "basis in fa c t."  A reasonable jury 
could find  tha t in at least one incident, Haley did not mark, m ismark, or o ffe r to  
mark a patient, and consequently, th a t there was no basis in fa c t fo r placing her on 
the CAP 3 disciplinary step.
Haley also claims th a t a ju ry  could question "the  factua l basis o f SRMC's 
claim tha t [she] was chronically ta rd y ."  Doc. #22 at 33. She points out tha t the 
determ ination o f an em ployee's tardiness could only be made by a comparison of 
the em ployee's schedule w ith  data from  the electronic tim e clock, and SRMC's 
failure to  preserve these schedules entitles her to  a rebuttable presumption tha t 
they w ould benefit her case. Id. The Court finds it unnecessary to  reach th is issue 
of spoliation at th is tim e, however, because the prin tout from  the tim e clock alone 
presents conflic ting  evidence tha t, if admissible, would best be evaluated by a jury.
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On tha t p rin tout, there are handw ritten notations ("due at 6 :0 0 ") next to  many 
entries th a t correspond to  the tardies listed on Haley's term ination form . Doc. 
#13-1 at 4-16. However, many entries also state tha t they are "approved by 
supervisor." Id. W hether or not the handw ritten  notations appear derived from  the 
schedule is an inference tha t is a " ju ry  fu n c tio n ," as is the w e igh t to  be given to 
the prin tou t itse lf and any resolution o f its con trad icto ry indications. Anderson v. 
L iberty  Lobby, Inc., 477  U.S. 242, 255 (1986). If the tardies were "approved by 
[a] supervisor," as the prin tou t indicates, a reasonable jury could infer tha t the 
SRMC's categorization o f them  as unexcused was pretextual.
Haley claims tha t the CAP 2, the firs t progressive d iscip linary step of 
consequence tha t Haley was subjected to , was never o ffic ia lly  adm inistered and 
th a t Elliot "w as putting  discip linary docum ents in Haley's file w ith o u t telling 
H aley." Doc. #22 at 32. Haley is not arguing tha t she did, in fac t, respond to  the 
pages in a tim e ly  fashion while on call, nor does she allege th a t SRMC fabricated 
its charges. She makes no challenge to  SRMC's tim eline o f the pages and her 
delayed arrival. According to  the Corrective A ction Form filled out by Elliot, SRMC 
policy expects an employee to  respond to  a page w ith in  five  m inutes and arrive at 
the hospital w ith in  20 -30  m inutes. Doc. #15-3 . Based on the tim eline on the 
form , Haley did not respond to  the hospita l's  page, was called at home, and arrived 
at the hospital 37 m inutes after the initia l page on June 2, 2009 . The second 
incident occurred on Ju ly 13, 2009 , w hen the page w en t out at 8 :15  p.m. and 
Haley clocked in at 9 :51 . She was indisputably late according to  hospital policy on
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each occasion. Thus, while a ju ry  could reasonably conclude there was no basis in 
fa c t fo r the site marking incidents and Haley's attendance vio lations, a factua l 
basis did exist fo r placing Haley at the CAP 2 discipline step fo r not answering 
pages while on call.
2. A reasonable ju ry  could conclude tha t SRMC's p ro ffe red  
reasons d id  n o t actua lly  m otiva te  Haley's discipline or 
term ination.
Haley's challenge to  the CAP 2 discipline step is more properly evaluated 
under the second M anzer inquiry, w hich requires the p la in tiff to  show  th a t the 
proffered reasons did not actually m otiva te  the em ployer's actions. M anzer v. 
Diam ond Shamrock Chem. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084  (6th Cir. 1994). Under this 
inquiry, "[t]he  p la in tiff admits the factua l basis underlying the em ployer's proffered 
explanation and fu rthe r admits th a t such conduct cou ld  m otivate dism issal. The 
p la in tiff's  a ttack on the cred ib ility  o f the proffered explanation is, instead, an 
indirect one." Id.
Although Haley's untim ely arrival a fte r being paged was a basis for 
discipline, Haley disputes tha t SRMC ever form ally  placed her at CAP 2 and claims 
tha t she was never form ally disciplined at the tim e. Doc. #18-55  at 2. A fte r 
discussing the incidents, Haley's term ination grievance states tha t Elliot gave her 
no indication tha t Haley was going to  be form ally  disciplined and did not ask her to 
sign anything. Id. Supporting th is  contention is Haley's handw ritten indication on 
the CAP 3 form  (issued several months a fte r the CAP 2) tha t she was not aware
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tha t the paging incidents had resulted in her being placed on the second 
disciplinary step. Doc. #18-52  at 2. Elliot, however, indicated on the CAP 3 form  
tha t Haley had seen the CAP 2 form  but refused to  sign it. Id. Haley also points 
out tha t the CAP 2 form  does not bear a "Received" stamp from  SRMC's human 
resources departm ent, as do the other discip linary form s tha t E llio tt drafted. 
Compare id. w ith  Doc. #15-3. Because o f th is, Haley claims tha t the discip linary 
step itse lf never occurred in an o ffic ia l manner and tha t Elliot "w as putting 
disciplinary docum ents in Haley's file w itho u t te lling Haley." Doc. #22 at 32. 
Construing the foregoing in Haley's favor, a reasonable jury m ight conclude tha t 
the CAP 2 step was bypassed in order to  hasten Haley's term ination. The Court 
concludes th a t a ju ry  should decide these contested factual issues, w hich are 
material because the issuance o f the CAP 2 was a necessary predicate to  Haley's 
term ination.
3. A reasonable ju ry  could conclude tha t SRMC's p ro ffe red  
reasons were insu ffic ie n t to discharge Haley.
Under the th ird  possible show ing of pre text, the p la in tiff m ust present 
su ffic ien t "evidence tha t other employees, particu larly employees outside the 
protected class, were not disciplined even though they engaged in substantia lly 
identical conduct to  th a t w hich the employer contends m otivated its discipline of 
the p la in tiff."  Chattm an v. Toho Tenax A m ., Inc., 686  F.3d 339, 349 (6th Cir. 
2012) (citing Manzer, 29 F.3d at 1084). This type of pretext also constitu tes "a 
d irect a ttack on the cred ib ility  o f the em ployer's proffered m otiva tion fo r
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disciplining the p la in tiff,"  resulting in the fac tfinde r's  possib le- but not required- 
inference of d iscrim ination. Chattman, 686 F.3d at 349; see also St. M ary 's  
Honor Ctr. v. H icks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) (stating tha t "re jection of the 
defendant's proffered reasons w ill perm it the trie r o f fa c t to  infer the u ltim ate fac t 
o f intentional d iscrim ination). In a summary judgm ent context, such an inference 
"creates a genuine, triable issue o f material fa c t."  Chattm an, 686  F.3d at 349.
Haley argues tha t a jury could conclude th a t her attendance was an 
insu ffic ien t reason fo r her discharge, pointing to  SRMC's dissim ilar trea tm ent of 
tw o  sim ilarly s ituated, younger employees. Both Amanda D illow  and Rick Parker 
were younger, had sim ilar or worse attendance records, yet SRMC neither 
term inated nor s im ilarly disciplined either employee. See supra Section IV.A. A 
reasonable ju ry  could infer d iscrim ination from  SRMC's d iffe ren t trea tm ent o f its 
younger employees.
SRMC responds th a t th is discrepancy in trea tm ent was due to  Elliot's 
"inab ility  to  keep up w ith  her w ork load" because, as supervisor, she had over 100 
employees w ho reported to  her. Doc. #13 at 13. The explanation may very well 
convince a ju ry, but tha t would involve a determ ination o f cred ib ility  th a t only a 
jury should make. A reasonable ju ry  m ight believe tha t SRMC's trea tm ent was due 
solely to E lliot's inability to  adequately m onitor all the employees w ho reported to  
her; or, in the alternative, it m ight find E lliot's explanation pretextual. Because of 
th is, a genuine issue o f material fa c t exists as to  w hether discrim ination or Eliot's 
overwork lay behind SRMC's d iffe rentia l trea tm ent o f Haley.
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"P retext is a commonsense inquiry: did the employer fire employee fo r the 
stated reason or not?" Chen v. D ow  Chem. Co., 580  F.3d 394, 400  n.4. The 
Court cannot answer th is question at the summary judgm ent stage, because of the 
array o f unresolved factua l issues tha t a reasonable jury could consider pretextual. 
To summarize, these include the factua l bases fo r the site marking incidents 
(further confused by SRMC's inconsistent evidence and statem ents) and Haley's 
attendance record; w hether Haley was actually placed on the CAP 2 disciplinary 
step; and the more lenient stance SRMC took w ith  sim ilarly situated employees.
The Court finds th a t Haley has presented su ffic ien t evidence o f genuinely 
disputed material fac ts  such th a t a ju ry  could doubt SRMC's stated reasons fo r its 
actions. As the S ixth C ircu it stated in Chen, " [a ]t the summary judgm ent stage, 
the issue is w hether the p la in tiff has produced evidence from  w hich a ju ry  could 
reasonably doubt the em ployer's explanation. If so, her prima facie case is 
su ffic ien t to support an inference of d iscrim ination at tr ia l."  Chen, 580  F.3d at 
4 0 0  n.4  (citing St. M ary 's  H onor Ctr. v. H icks, 509  U.S. 502, 511 (1993). The 
Court accordingly makes no determ ination as to  the d iscrim ination Haley alleges 
th a t a jury m ight or m ight not infer from  SRMC's actions. Such a determ ination is 
solely the function  o f the ju ry, as is the resolution o f the disputed factua l issues 
described herein.
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V. Conclusion
Accord ing ly, fo r the reasons set fo rth  above, the Court OVERRULES 
D efendants' M otion fo r Summary Judgm ent (Doc. #13).
Counsel of record w ill note th a t a telephone conference call w ill be convened 
by the Court at 8 :30  a.m. on Friday, February 8, 2013 , fo r the purpose of 
determ ining the v iab ility  o f the M ay 20, 2013  trial date.
Date: January 28, 2013
WALTER H. RICE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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